Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1978

Califano v. Boles
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Califano v. Boles. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 62. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

~

?-vtv ~ ~ 1--o ~

.d-e

~~~~~¥--~
c2-

~kw:- ~ ~ ~

~ ~~~~~
-

---------

--::>

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
January 19, 1979 Conference
List 1, sheet 1
No. 78-808-ADX
Califano (HEW Secy)

v.
Boles (claimants of Social
Security benefits)
SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

The DJ held unconstitutional the provision of the
ll

Social Security Act which denies Mother's Insurance benefits to
~

women who were never married to a deceaent although children of
--~---------------------------the woman and the decedent are entitled to Children's Insurance

--

benefits.
FACTS:
Nancy Boles.

When Norman Boles died in 1971 he was married to
Two sons were born of that mnrriage.

The sons

and Nancy Boles are receiving benefits under 42

u.s.c.

§

402{g)

which provides for separate benefits for mothers and children.
Before Norman Boles married Nancy Boles he lived with resp

------.

Margaret Gonzales.

Resp Boles was born while Norman Boles and

Margaret Gonzales were living together.
receiving benefits under

§

402(g).

Resp Boles is also

Resp Gonzales has been

9 - ~~
~A

denied benefits because she was never married to Norman Boles. ~
Resps sued petr claiming to represent the class of "all

------

illegitimate children and their mothers who are presently
~
ineligible for Mother's Insurance Benefits solely because 42

u.s.c.

§

402 (g) (1) restricts such benefits to women who were

once married to the fathers of their children."
HOLDING BELOW:

The DC certified the national class and

held the statute unconstitutional because it violated equal

----

protection by discriminating against illegitimate children.
The court enjoined HEW from denying benefits to the class.
court also ordered petr to make retroactive

The

ayments to resp

~

and to notify all members o

no longer

ineligible for benefits solely because of the marriage
.requirement.

According to the DJ the decision turned on the

characterization Qf the benefits.

Petr claimed that the

Mother's Benefits were intended to benefit the mother and that
denial of the benefits did not affect the child.
that the purpose of

§

Resps argued

402 was to benefit the child and that

paying benefits to the mother would result in benefit to the
child. The DJ sided with resp.
In reaching that conclusion the DC relied upon Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648-49 (1975).

The purpose of the

payment of benefits to the mother, according to the DC, was to

permit the mother to stay at home with the child.
I

CONTENTIONS:

(1} Petr contends that the DC misinterpreted

the purpose of the statutory scheme. · According to petr the
benefits payable to the mother were designed to compensate for
her loss of financial support, not to provide an additional
payment to the children.

With that intent, the statute's

reliance upon marriage as an indicator of economic dependence
was reasonable.

In addition, petr points out that the total

benefits paid as a result of Mr. Boles' death are limited
because they are based upon his lifetime earnings.

Any money

paid to resp Gonzales will necessarily reduce the amount paid
to Mrs. Boles and her two children, thereby thwarting the
primary purpose of the section -- to permit a surviving parent
to forego outside employment and stay home with the children.
Resp argues that the payments are all designed to aid the
children, citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645-53
(1975}.

Resp supports that position by pointing out that a

widow with no children receives no benefits; that benefits are
terminated once the child is no longer in the woman's custody;
and that the benefits are terminated after the child reaches a
certain age.

Other than benefits that are dependent upon the

relationship with a child the woman must wait until she reaches
a specified age before she can receive benefits in her own
right.
Petr contends that the statute does not discriminate
against illegitimates since they receive benefits under some
conditions.

Moreover, the status of illegitimacy is not

suspect and this use is permissible.
Resp replies that the discrimination violates the Fifth

Amendment, citing Lalli v. Lalli, 47 U.S.L.W. 4061.
(2) Petr argues that it was improper to certify a national
-------------------------------------------~

class and to issue an injunction bas~d upon that class.

By

granting relief to those who had not filed a claim for benefits
the DC violated the restriction of 42

u.s.c.

§

405(g).

According to petr the DC should have limited relief to the
parties before it.

Petr refers to its brief in California v.

Elliott, No. 77-1511, cert granted, October 2, 1978.
Resp contends that the limited relief granted in this case
is permissible under

405(g).

§

All that the DC ordered was

that petr notify persons who had been denied benefits that they
were entitled to apply for them.

Furthermore,

§

405(g) is no

bar to this action since jurisdiction was asserted under

§

1331, as a claim arising under the Constitution.
(3) Petr contends that the United States had not waived its
sovereign immunity and that the award of retroactive benefits
was therefore inappropriate.

Petr refers to pages 28-31 of its

brief in California v. Aznavorian, 47 U.S.L.W. 4037 (December
11, 1978) (Nos. 77-991, 77-5999).
U.S.C.

§

There petr contends that 42

1383(b) permits retroactive benefits only when there

has been an incorrect interpretation of the statute.

In such

cases, the decision of a court amounts to no more than an order
that the administrator conform his conduct to the .intent of
Congress.

Therefore,

§

1383 constitutes waiver of sovereign

immunity to permit the retroactive payment of benefits that
-

Congress intented the beneficiary to receive initially.

By

contrast, where Congress' intent is held to be
unconstitutional, there can be no waiver of immunity.
Resp contends that this argument is not properly before the

- 5 -

Court because it was not raised below.

Furthermore, resp

contends that petr waived this defense by failing to plead it

l

as an affirmative defense or to raise it below.
DISCUSSION:

The key question in petr's first contention is

whether § 402(g) was

i~d

to benefit children or mothers.

The DC correctly concluded that the question has been answered
by

Weinber~

v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648-53 (1975).

There the Court held that the purpose of

§

402(g) was to

provide children with an opportunity for the personal attention
of the surviving parent.

The Court examined the legislative

history of the section and concluded that had Congress intended
to benefit the surviving parent it would not have conditioned
the receipt of benefits upon the presence of children.

Petr's

reliance upon Califano v. Jobst, 434 u.s. 47, 52-53 (1977), is
'------misplaced. There the Court upheld the denial of benefits to a
child who married, reasoning that it was rational to conclude
that a married child is less likely to be dependent upon the
parent for support.

It does not follow from that conclusion

that a woman who did not marry the father of her child is less
likely to be economically dependent upon the father than is a
woman who did marry him.
the wrong relationship:

Moreover, petr's argument focuse s on
once it is conceded that the statute

seeks to benefit children, the economic dependency of the
mother is irrelevant.

Since the statute does not deprive

illegitimate children of Children's Benefits, the rationale of
Jobst is of no relevance.
Since

§

402(g) is intended to benefit children after the

death of a parent, the effect of denying benefits to women such
as resp is to discriminat e against illegitimate children.

That

discrimination is unconstitutional under decisions such as
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
Petr's second contention is presented in California v.
Elliott, No. 77-1511.

This case should

be ~eld

-

for that one.

Petr's third contention was presented but not decided in
California v. Aznavorian, 47 U.S.L.W. 4037, 4039 (December 12,
1978).

There app\.ars to be no reason in this case to depart

from the established principle that an agent of the sovereign
lacks the authority to waive sovereign immunity.

See,

~,

United States v. New York Rayon Importing Company, 329 U.S.
654, 660 (1947).

l

The question therefore becomes whether Congress has waived
the Government's immunity by enacting 42

u.s.c.

§

1383(b).

Petr's argument has some basis, beginning with the premise that
waivers of immunity are to be strictly construed.

In enacting

sections of the Social Security law Congress intended that
payments be made to certain beneficiaries.

When a court

determines that an administrative interpretation conflicts with
Congress' intent and enjoins further reliance on that incorrect
interpretation it can be said that the court has done nothing
other than direct -what Congress originally intended.

The

original intent then becomes the basis for saying that Congress
waived the Government's immunity from a retroactive award.

In

this case, Congress intended that mothers of illegitimate
children not receive benefits.

The declaration that such an

intent is unconstitutional cannot form the basis for inferring
that Congress waived immunity.
another way.

But waiver may be inferred in

The prospective effect of a declaration that a

statute violates equal protection · is to require Congress either

- 7 to amend the statute to provide equal.ity of treatment or to
repeal the classification altogether.

With regard to the past

the choice has already been made in favor of making
Congress cannot repeal payments already made.

payments~

Thus, the

court's award of retroactive benefits can be said to conform
the past conduct to the mandate of the Constitution.

So the

conclusion would be that the DC's award here does not violate
sovereign immunity.

Nevertheless, the question is one that the

Conference may want to discuss as part of its broader
consideration of the legal enforcement of the Social Security
Act.
There is a response.
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 78-808, Califano v. Boles
If a wage earner who is fully insured under the Social

Security program dies, his children are eligible for Children's
Insurance Benefits.

These are payable whether the child is

legitimate or illegitimate.

The wage earner's widow or former

spouse (divorced before his death) may also be eligible for
benefits, denominated Mother's Insurance Benefits, if she has
legitimate or illegitimate children of the wage earner in her
care.

-

The question in this case, discussed in Section I of this

-- --

memorandum, is whether the Equal Protection Clause is violated
~
by this disqualification of women who have not married the wage

--------------------

----

"""

-

earner but who do have the children of the wage earner in their

-

care.

In Section II, I mention briefly two issues of remedy

that are also presented.

2.
I

The claimant-appellee in this action, Gonzales, is the
mother of an illegitimate child by Boles, the deceased wage

'------------

earner.

That child collects Children•s Insurance Benefits, as

'-----

do Boles• legitimate children; Boles• widow, who cares for the
legitimate children, collects Mother•s Insurance Benefits.
Gonzales cares for the illegitimate child, and on that basis
applied for Mother•s Insurance Benefits.

Because 42 U.S.C.

§402(g) denies benefits to women who have not been married to
the wage earner, the appellee•s application was refused.
Appellee then filed this suit to challenge the
constitutionality of §402(g).

The DC certified a class

"consisting of all illegitimate children and their mothers who
are presently ineligible for Mother•s Insurance Benefits solely
because 42

u.s.c.

§402(g)(1) restricts such benefits to women

who were once married to the fathers of their children."

The

appellee sought the following relief, which was granted by the
DC:

(i) a declaration that §402(g) is unconstitutional insofar

as it excludes mothers in the plaintiff class; (ii) an
injunction barring the appellants from denying Mother•s
Insurance Benefits to mothers in the plaintiff class; (iii)
payments of benefits to the named plaintiff retroactive to her
application for the benefits; and (iv) notice to members of the
plaintiff class that the unconstitutional bar to Mother•s
Benefits had been removed.

3.
The appellee defends the judgment of the court below on
the ground that Mother's Benefits are meant for the benefit of
the children in the women's care.

Eligibility for the benefits

thus is conditioned in part on the women having children of the
wage earner in her care.

And the legislative history of §402(g)

shows that the purpose underlying the section is to enable women
"' - ---··--

·- --

----~·

---··

who choose to do so to stay home and care for their children.
"Congress was .•. concerned in §402(q) with •.• the
principle that children of covered employees are
entitled to the personal attention of the surviving
parent if that parent chooses not to work.
"Given the purpose of enabling the surviving
parent to remain at home to care for a child, the
gender-based distinction of §402(q) is entirely
irrational." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636, 651 (1975).
The appellees argue that given this congressional judgment that
children of the waqe earner should have the care of the
remaining parent, that care cannot be denied to illegitimate
children.

Yet, by conditioning eligibility on the marriage of

the wage earner and the women caring for the child,

~402(g)

does

discriminate against illegitimates.
The SG defends the statute on the ground that its
purpose is to provide support for dependents of the deceased
wage earner.

It is the relationship of the beneficiary to the

wage earner, he urges, that determines the beneficiary's prior
dependence on the wage earner, and not the relationship of the
beneficiary to another beneficiary.

He points out that in the

Court's cases, the use of marriage as a criterion of dependency
has been upheld against constitutional challenge.
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977)

E.g.,

(provision of Social

4.
Security Act that benefits paid to disabled dependent child of a
covered wage earner shall terminate when the child marries an
individual who is not entitled to benefits under the Act held
not to violate the Fifth Amendment because "marriage is an event
which normally marks an important change in economic status");
Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976)

(married women with

minor children in her care whose husband retires or becomes
disabled received benefits, while divorced women otherwise
similarly situated do not; held, not to violate the Fifth
Amendment because marriage is a fair indicator of economic
dependence).
I lean, though not strongly, towards the SG's position,
on the basis of the following analysis.

~
A~

/"...
{/"'....

J;:;

This case does not

involve the payment of benefits to minor children of the wage
earner.

All

~ildren,
/

legitimate and illegitimate alike,

are eligible for such benefits.

The only basis for challenging

the statute is the derivative and de facto (rather than

~ intentional) discrimination against illegitimates that results

~

from the marriage criterion for Mother's Benefits.

:~~legitimates
~·

Those

who live with a woman who was not married to their

father do not get the derivative benefit of having their
caretaker receive Mother's Benefits.

(On the other hand,

illegitimates who do happen to live with a woman who was married
to the wage earner qualify that woman for Mother's Benefits, and
receive the indirect benefit from such support.)

~~~~2-v

~~~~
{~-)~ ~~ni£S~-

The purpose of the second ry benefits to depende~ t~ ~
under the Social Security Act is to replace the support provided
by the wage earner.

Even if the purpose of the Mother's

Benefits is to allow women to stay home and continue to care for
children of the wage earner living with them, the marriage
requirement represents a defensible estimate of which women were
dependent on the wage earner. Only these wome ~re likely to need

-

_.,

the replacement of the support previously provided by the wage
earner if they are to have the option of staying at home to care
for the children.

And it is only these women, and not all needy

women with children in their care, that are the concern of the
Social Security program.

Accordingly, the proper way of

characterizing the legislative policy underlying §402(g) is that

-

Congress intended to provide benefits for those women who were
dependent on the wage earner (as measured by the marriage
-----------~------------criterion) so that they could have the option of remaining at
home to care for the minor children of the wage earner in their
care.

An illegitimate child living with his mother is denied

the indirect benefit of Mother's Benefits not because he is
illegitimate but because his mother was not dependent on his
father for support.
The SG is correct in pointing out that this Court's
prior cases have approved similar uses
to measure dependency.
mentioned above, I think

~ he

marriage criterion

In addition to Jobst and DeCastro,

that ~einberger

(1975), can be numbered among this group.

v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
There the Court

sustained the constitutionality of the requirement that a

....

'

.

6.
surviving spouse must have been married to the deceased wage
earner for at least nine months to qualify for benefits upon the
death of the wage earner.

In his extensive opinion for the

Court, Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the general applicability of
the rationality test to legislative classifications such as the
marriage criterion.
There is a credible argument that the marriage
criterion, as used in §202(g), does not meet this rationality
test because it is overinclusive and underinclusive.

It is

overinclusive to the extent that any previous marriage to the
wage earner (including ones ended in divorce long before the
wage earner's death) will meet the requirement.

In many

instances in which the wage earner has divorced his spouse
before his death, there may be no obligation of continuing
support and no support in fact by the wage earner.

And it is

underinclusive to the extent that some women caring for
illegitimate children are in fact supported by the wage earnerfathers of those children.
I take it, however, that to invalidate the statute
under the Dandridge v. Williams test, it would have to be shown
that the marriage criterion did result in fact in significant
over- and underinclusion.

There has been no such factual

showing in this case, and I do not think that the facts are so
apparent as to obviate the need for evidence.
One difference between the prior cases dealing with the
marriage exception and the present case is that none of the
prior cases involved a claim that the marriage distinction

7.

discriminated indirectly against illegitimates.

But the

statute's effect on some illegitimate children is indirect and
unintended, and does not seem to me to call for any more
demanding standard than the rationality test of Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

This kind of indirect and

unintended consequence of an otherwise rational classification
does not amount to the invidious discrimination against
specially protected groups that runs afoul of the equality
principle of the Fifth Amendment.
"The relation between the equal protection
analysis of Dandridge and the Fifth Amendment due
process analys1s of Flemming v. Nestor and
Richardson v. Belcher was descri5ed in the latter
case in this language:
"A statutory classification in the area of
social welfare is consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if
it is 'rationally based and free from invidious
discrimination.'
Dandridge v. Williiams, 397
U.S. 471, 487." Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at
770.
The SG makes the foregoing argument in the strongest
.:::___..,_
terms by insisting that under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), only intentional acts of discrimination against
illegitimates should be subject to special scrutiny.

I think

that there is considerable merit in this suggestion.

Although

the Court has consistently refused to subject classifications
based on illegitimacy to "strict scrutiny," it is also true that
such classifications have been subject to special examination.
Such special scrutiny would seem to be justified only when the
classification is expressly in terms of illegitimacy, or
expressly intended to discriminate against illegitimates on
account of their illegitimacy.

Otherwise, any correlation

8.

between an otherwise rational classification and
disproportionate effects on illegitimate children is simply
coincidental, and not constitutionally objectionable.
II

The SG also raises two points regarding the remedy
ordered by the DC.

He argues that retroactive benefits for the

named plaintiff are barred by sovereign immunity, and that the
jurisdictional provision of the Social Security Act under which
this suit must be maintained precludes the remedy of notice to
all newly eligible women.
The SG contends that §205(g) of the Social Security Act
merely gives the DC jurisdiction to hear cases challenging
determinations of eligibility for Social Security benefits, and
does not constitute in addition ·a waiver of sovereign immunity
from damage claims based on wrongful denial of benefits.
relies on United States v. Testan, 424

u.s.

He

392 (1976), which

reached a similar conclusion about the jurisdictional provision
of the Tucker Act.
This argument is a good one, but does not go as far as
the SG would like.

Another section of the Social Security Act,

Section 204(a), directs the payment of retroactive benefits to
persons wrongfully denied benefits to which they are entitled
under the Act.

The SG argues that this section only applies

when the denial was based on a misconstruction of the Act rather
than a proper construction of a provision later held
unconstitutional.

This is not an unreasonable reading of the

section, which does refer to failures to make payments due "to

9.

any person under this subchapter".

But I think that the more

reasonable construction of §204(a) is that it authorizes
retroactive payment of benefits wrongfully denied on the basis
of an unconstitutional condition of eligibility as well as on an
incorrect construction of the statute.

The statute has been

construed in this fashion by Justice Stevens when he was sitting
as a circuit judge.

Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 704

(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
The SG also argues that the class relief granted was
improper for several reasons.

-----

Section 205(g) of the Social

Security Act, the jurisdictional statute for claims arising
under the Act, provides in pertinent part as follows:
"Any individual, after any final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a
party, ••. may obtain review of such decision by a
civil action commenced within sixty days after the
mailing to him of notice of such decision or within
such further time as the Secretary may allow. Such
action shall be brought in the district court of the
United States for the judicial district in which the
plaintiff resides or has his principal place of
business •.•. 11
The SG argues that when read in conjunction with
§205(h), which provides that "[n]o action against the United
States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall
be brought under section 41

[§§1331 et seq.] of Title 28 to

recover on any claim arising under this subchapter", §205(g)
provides the sole jurisdictional basis for any action raising a
claim under the Social Security laws.
assertions about §205(g).

The SG makes several

First, since the section explicitly

states "any individual," class relief is not available.

Second,

even if class relief is available, the class may only include

10

0

persons who have applied for benefits and been denied them by
the Secretary, while here the class was described simply as all
women (or mothers) ineligible for benefits by reason of §202(g).
Third, the class must be restricted to members residing or
having their principal place of business in the same judicial
district as the named plaintiff, while here the DC ordered
relief for a nationwide class.
These issues were fully aired in Califano v. Elliott,
No. 77-1511, argued during March.

The opinion in the case has

been assigned to Justice Blackmun, and I have spoken with his
clerk about the §205(g) question.

Bill says that the question

was reached and decided in Elliott by a vote of 8-0, but
confesses that he cannot tell from Justice Blackmun's notes
exactly what resolution was agreed upon by the Conference.

He

intends to ask Justice Blackmun to take the occasion of the
present case to clarify the position of the Conference on the
question.
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Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary 1
On Appeal from the United
of Health, Education, and
States District Court for
Welfare, Appellant,
the Western District of ~
v.
Texas. ( 4J II-A'~
Norman J . Boles et, al.

j

[June - , 1979]

MR. JusTICE REHNQUIS'r delivered the opinion of the Court.
Since the Depression of the 1930's, the Government has
taken increasingly upon itself the task of insulating the
economy at large and the individual from the buffeting of
economic fortune. The federal old-age, survivors, and disability insurance provisions of the Social Security Act (SSA)
are possibly the pre-eminent examples: attempts to obviate,
through a program of forced savings, the economic dislocations
that may otherwise accompany old age, disability or the death
of a breadwinner. As an exercise in governmental administration, the social security system is of unprecedented dimension; in Fiscal Year 1977 nearly 150 million claims were filed. 1
Given this magnitude, the number of times these SSA
claims have reached this Court warrants little surprise. 2 Our
1 Social Secunty Administration';; Office of Management and Admini tration, The Year in Review: The Administration of Social Security Programs 1977, at ii (July 1978) .
2
Califmw v. Jobst, 4:34 U.S. 47 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
3'13 (1977) ; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977); Matthews v.
De Castro, 429 U. S. 181 (1976); Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524
(1976); Mathett•s v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U. S. 319 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U. S. 749 (1975); Weinberger v. Wwsenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Jimmez v. Weinberger, 417
U. S. 628 (1974); Richardson v. Wright, 405 U S. 208 (1972) ; Richardson •
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cases evidence a sensitivity to the legislative and administrative problems posed in the design of such a program and in
the adjudication of claims on this scale. The problems are
generally of two types. The first is categorization. 3 In light
of the ilpecific dislocations Congress wishes to alleviate. it is
necessary to define categories of beneficiaries. The process of
categorization presents the difficulties i11herent in any linedrawing exercise where the draftsman confronts a universe of
potential beneficiaries with different histories and distinct
needs. He strives for a level of generality that is administratively practicable, with full appreciation that the included
class has members whose "needs" upon a statutorily defined
v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) ; Richm·dson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(Hl71) ; Flemming v. N estor , 363 U.S. 603 (1960) . This Court ha::; also
had mnnrrous ca.~('~ involving rlaim~ tlfl~ing und('r frderal-state cooperative
welfare program,: authoriz('d by the SSA. See, e. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (A~ i,.;tancc to Prr,;ons Permanently and Totally
Disabled) ; California Dept. of Human Resources Development v. Java,
402 U . S. 121 (1971) (unrmployment insurance); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U . R. 471 (1970) (Aid to Familirs With Dependent Children).
8 Th(' bulk of om rases fall under this heading.
Califano v. Jobst, 434
U. S. 47 (Hl77) (termumtiOn of drprndent child's benefits upon his marriage) ; Califano v. Webste1·, 4:30 U. S. 313 (1977) (gender-based differrnces in benefit c·omputation) ; Califa:no v. Goldfarb, 430 U .S. 199 (1977)
(grnder-ba~rcl diffrrrnees in dPfining d('prndt>nt of drrra,.;Pcl wage eamrr);
Matthews, .. De ('astra, 429 l l. S. 181 (1976) (denial of "wife's insurance
brnefits" to divorced women under 62 yPars of age) ; Norton v. Mathews,
427 U. S. 524 (1976) (illegitimate children denied presumption of dependency rnjoyrd by lrgitimatrs ) ; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495 (1976)
(snmo n~ Nortou) ; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975) (durationof-relation::;hip requirrment::; for receipt of mot-her's or child's insurance
benefit~) ; ll'einber(Jer v. ll'iesenfeld. 420 U. S. 636 (1975) (grnder-based
rlrnial of Rurvivor·~ brnefit~ to Widowrr,.;) ; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U . S. 628 (Hl74) (denial of rli~ability insurance benefits to illegitimate
rhildren born aftPr onsf\t. of wage ramer's diHa bility); Richardson v.
Belcher. 404 U. S. 7R ( 1971) ( rrductwn in socwl ::;ecurity benefits to reflect
&tnte workmrn '::; c-ompensation brnefitH); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S.
603 (19GO) (termination of in::;uranre benrfits to aliens upon their
deportation) .
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occurrence may not be as marked as those of isolated individuals outside the classification. "General rules are essential
if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a
modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual
cases." Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977). A process
of case-by-case adjudication that would provide a "perfect fit"
in theory would increase administrative expenses to a degree
that benefit levels would probably be reduced, precluding a
perfect fit in fact. Mat hews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 509
(1976); Weinberger v. Sal-fi, 422 U.S. 749, 776-777 (1975).
The second type of problem that has been brought to this
Court invol vcs the Social Security Administration's procedures for dispute resolution where benefits have been
denied, decreased or terminated because the Administration has concluded that the claimant is not entitled to what
he has requested or to what he has received in the past. 4
Again the Court has been sensitive to the special difficulties
presented by the mass administration of the social security
system. After the legislative task of classification is completed, the administrative goal is accuracy and promptness in
the actual allocation of benefits pursuant to those classifications. The magnitude of that task is not amenable to the
full trappings of the adversary process lest again benefit levels
be threatened by the costs of administration. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 343-349 (1976); Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 406 (1971). Fairness can best be
assured by Congress and the Social Security Administration
4
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (question whether evidentiary hearing nece::;sary before termination of disability ir:;urance benefits);
Richardson Y. Wright. 405 U. S. 208 (1972) (challenge to procedures
employed in suspen::;ion or termination of cli::;ability benefit::;); Richardson
\'. Pel'ales. 402 U. S. 389 (1971) (written reports by phy::;ician::; who have
examined disability in::;urancc claimants are "::;ub::;tantial evidence" sup,..
porting denial of benefits) .
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through sound managerial techniques and quality control
designed to achieve an acceptable rate of error.
This case involves a challenge to a categorization. Appellees
Norman J. Boles and Margaret Gonzales represent a nationwide class of all illegitimate children and their mothers who
are allegedly ineligible for insurance benefits under the Social
Security Act because in each case the mother ~neve; married to the wa e earner who fathered her child. Section 202
(g) 1) o the Social , ecun y c , 42 U. S. C. § 402 (g) (1)
(1976), only makes "mother's insurance benefits" available to
widows and divorced wives 5 By virtue of this Court's deciSection 202 (g) (1) providt'$ :
"(g) (1) The widow and every , urviving divorced mother (as defined
in section 216 (d)) of an individual who diE'd a fully or currently insured
individual, if such widow or :;urviving divorced mother" (A) i:-; not. marncd,
"(B) is not entitled to a widow's insurancE' bE'nefit,
"(C) is not entitled to old-agE' insurancE' benefits, or is entitled to old-age
insurance benefits each of which is less than three-fourths of the primary
insuraneo amount of such individual,
" (D) has filed application for mother's insurance bE'nefits, or was entitled
to wife's immrance benefits on the basis of the wages and self-employment
income of such individual for the month preceding the month in which he
died,
"(E) a.t, the time of filing such application has in her care a child of such
individual E'ntitled to a child'::; insurance benefit, and
" (F) in the case of a survivmg divorced mothcr" (i) the child referred to in subparagraph (E) is her son, daughter, or
legally adopted child, and
"(ii) the benefits referred to in such subparagraph are payable on the
basis of such individual's wage,; and ~elf-employment income,
"shall (subject to subsection (s) of th1s section) be entitled to a mother's
insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after
August 1950 in which she bE'comE's RO mtitlcd to such insurance benefits
and ending with the month preceding the first month in which any of the
following occurs: no child of such deceased individual i::; entitled to a
child's insurance bE'nefit, such widow or surviving divorced mother bE'comes
en! itled to nn old-age in:ourance benefit equal to or exceeding three-fourths
of the primary in~urance amount of HU('h deceased individual, she becomes
5
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sion in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975),
"mother's insurance benefits" are available to widowers, leaving the title of these benefits a misnomer. There we held
that the provision of such benefits only to women violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Norman W. Boles died in 1971. He left a widow, Nancy L.
Boles, and their two children, who were each promptly awarded
child's insurance benefits. Nancy Boles receives mother's
insurance benefits. Appellee Gonzales lived with Norman W.
Boles for three years before his marriage to Nancy Boles and
bore a son by him, Norman J. Boles. 6 Gonzales sought
mother's insurance benefits for herself and child's benefits
for her son. Her son was granted benefits, but her personal
request was denied because she had never been married to the
wage earner.
Gonzales exhausted her administrative remedies and then
filed this suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas. The District Court certified a
class o{ "all illegitimate children and their mothers who are
presently ineligible for Mother's Insurance Benefits solely
because 42 U. S. C. § 402 (g) (I) restricts such benefits to
entitled to a widow's insuranoo benefit, she remarries, or she dies. Entitlement to such benefit::; shall also <:>nd, in the case of a surviving divorced
mother, with the month immediately preceding the first month in which
no son, daughter, or legally adopted child of such surviving divorced
mother is entitled to a child's insurance benefit on the basis of the wages
and self-employment income of such deceased individual."
Secii0n 216 (d) (:3), 42 U.S. C. ~ 4Hi (d) (3) (1976), state~ :
"(3) The term 'surviving divorced mother' means a woman divorced
from an individual who has died, but only if (A) she is the mother of his
son or daughter, (B) she legally adopted his son or daughter while she
was married to him and while such son or daughtrr was undrr the age of
18, (C) he legally adoptrd her son or daughter while she was married to
him and while such son or daughter was under the age of 18, or (D) she
was married to him at the time both of them legally adopted a child under
the age of 18."
6 Norman W. Bole~ had acknowledged his paternity of Norman J. Boles.
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women who were once married to the fathers of their children." J. S., at 1a. The District Court found that ~ 202 (g)
(1) of the Social Security Act was unconstitutional. There
were three steps in its logic.
First, it read Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, as holding
that mother's insurance benefits are chiefly for the benefit of
the child. Tt quoted from a passage in that opinion where
this Court observed that
"§ 402 (g). linked as it is directly to responsibility for
minor children. was intended to permit women to elect
not to work and to devote themselves to the care of
children . . ..
"That the purpose behind ~ 402 (g) is to provide children deprived of one parent with the opportunity for the
personal attention of the other could not be more clear
in the legislative history." 420 U. S., at 648-649.
On the basis of this language it then concluded that for purposes of equal protection analysis, the pertinent discrimination
in this case is not unequal treatment of unwed mothers,
but rather discrimination against illegitimate children. In
its final step the District Court held that the application of
§ 202 (g)( 1) at issue here is unconstitutional, relying on cases
of this Court invalidating on constitutional grounds legislation
that discriminated against illegitimates solely because of their
status at birth. E. g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535
(1973); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
We noted probable jurisdiction, U. S. - , and now
conclude that the District Court incorrectly analyzed the
equal protection issue in this case. We accordingly reverse:
As this Court noted in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at
643, § 202 (g) "was added to the Social Security Act in 1939
as one of a large number of amendments designed to 'afford
more adequate protectioll to the family .as a unit.' H. R.
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Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1939)." The benefits
created in 1939 "were intended to provide persons dependent
on the wage earner with protection against the economic
hardship occasioned by loss of the wage earner's support."
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 50 (1977); see Mathews v.
De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 185-186 (1976). Specifically, § 202
(g) "was intended to permit women [and now men] to elect
not to work and to devote themselves to care of children."
420 U. S., at 648. The animating concern was the economic
dislocation that occurs when the wage earner dies and the surviving parent is left with the choice to stay home and care
for the children or to go to work, a hardship often exacerbated
by years outside the labor force. "Mother's insurance benefits" were intended to make the choice to stay home easier.
But the program was not designed to be, and we think is not
now, a general system for the dispensing of child-care subsidies.7 Instead Congress sought to limit the category of
beneficiaries to those who actually suffer economic dislocation
upon the death of a wage earner and are likely to be confronted at that juncture with the choice between employment
or the assumption of full-time child-care responsibilities.
In this light there is an obvious logic in the exclusion from
§ 202 (g) of women or men who have never married the wage
earner. "Both tradition and common experience support the
conclusion that marriage is an event which normally marks an
important change in economic status." Califano v. Jobst,
434 U. S. 47, 53 (1977). Congress could reasonably conclude
that a woman who has never been married to the wage earner
is far less likely to be dependent upon the wage earner at the
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 52 (1977) •
"The statutr is dr,;igned to providr the wagr eamer and the dependent
members of his family with protect 1011 again;;t the hardship occa.'<ioned by
his loHS of earning~ ; it is not Simply a welfare program generally brnefiting
needy per::;onR."
See also Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 1R1, 185-186 (1976) .
7

'

.
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time of his death. He was never legally required to support
her and therefore less likely to have been an important source
of income. Thus the possibility of severe economic dislocation upon his death is more remote.
We confronted an analogous classification in Mathews v.
De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976), which involved a challenge to
the exclusion of divorced women from "wife's income benefits." In concluding that the classification did not deny equal
protection, we observed :
"Divorce by its nature works a drastic change in the
economic and personal relationship between a husband
and wife. . . . Congress could have rationally assumed
that divorced husbands and wives depend less on each
other for financial and other support than do couples who
stay married. The problems that a divorced wife may
encounter when her former husband becomes old or disabled may well differ in kind and degree from those that
a woman married to a retired or disabled husband must
face . . . . She may not feel the pinch of the extra
expenses accompanying her former husband's old age or
disability. . . . It was not irrational for Congress to
recognize this basic fact in deciding to defer monthly
payments to divorced wives of retired or disabled wage
earners until they reach the age of 62. " /d., at 188-189.
Likewise, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) , upheld a
nine-month duration of relationship eligibility requirement
for the wife and step-children of a deceased wage earner. The
stated purpose of the requirement was "to prevent the use of
sham marriages to secure Social Security payments." Id., at
767. We found that only relevant constitutional argument
was whether "the test [appellees could not] meet ·[was] not
so rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective that
it [could] be used to deprive them of benefits available to
those who fdid] satisfy that test.'' Td., at 772. We recognized
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that the statutory requirement would deny benefits in some
cases of legitimate, sincere marriage relationships.
"While it is possible to debate the wisdom of excluding
legitimate claimants in order to discourage sham relationships, and of relying on a rule which may not exclude
some obviously sham arrangements, we think it clear
that Congress could rationally choose to adopt such a
course. Large numbers of people are eligible for these
programs and are potentially subject to inquiry as to the
validity of their relationships to wage earners. . . . Not
only does the prophylactic approach thus obviate the
necessity for large numbers of individualized determinations, but it also protects large numbers of claimants who
satisfy the rule from the uncertainties and delays of
administrative inquiry into the circumstances of their
marriages." !d., at 781-782.
It is with this background that we must analyze what the
District Court in this case perceived to be the flaw in relying
on dependence as a rationale for the statutory distinction between married and unmarried persons. The District Court
pointed out that in 1972 Congress lifted the requirement that
divorced women seeking mother's insurance benefits show that
they were in some measure dependent on the wage earner
immediately before his death. 8 It seized this fact as refuta8 Originally, nothing similar to mother's insurance benefits for divorced
women was provided by the Social Security Act. Then in 1950 these benefits, subject to limitations not relevant here, were made available to a
surviving divorced wife, if she had not remarried, had a child in her care
entitled to child's insurance benPfits, and at the time of the wage Pamer's
death had been rect>iving at least one-half of hrr support from him. Act
of Augus1 28, 1950, Pub. L. 734, ch. 809, § 101 (a), 64 S1at. 485-486.
In 1965 tht> remarriage bar to mother'~ insurance brnt>fits was relaxed.
A woman's rights as a surviving divorced mothrr would be rt>stored if her
second marriagt> ended in divorcr. Mort>ovt>r, a showing that she was
receiving or entitled to recrive "substantial contributions" from the wage
earner ~~t the time of hi" death would ~uffice in lieu of a showing that she
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tion of any characterization of these benefits as an attempt to
ease the dislocation of those who had been dependent on the
deceased. We think the District Court is demanding a precision not warranted by our cases.
Certainly Congress did not envision such precision. The
legislative history surrounding the devolution of support requirements suggests that its effect on mother's insurance benefits was au incidental and relatively minor byproduct of
Congress' core concern: older women who were married to
wage earners for over 20 years-women who often only knew
work as housewives-who were not eligible for surviving
divorced wife's insurance benefits because state divorce laws
did not permit alimony or because they had accepted a property settlement in lieu of alimony. 0 The Social Security laws
received at least one-half of hrr support from the wage earner. Act of
July 30, 1965, Pub. L. 89-97, § 308,79 Sta1. 377-379.
Finally in 19i2 Congrrss madr thr changrs cli;;cusl:'ed by the Di~trict
Court. Pub. L. 92-603, § 114 (c), 86 Stat. lMR--1:349.
9 lntercstingly, younger women receiving mother's benefit~ are not even
mentioned in the committee report A on the 1972 amendment.
"Benefits, under prrsent law, arc payablr to a divorced wifr age 62
or older and a divorrrd widow age fiO or older if her marriage lasted at
least 20 yrars before the dtvorce, and to a survtving divorced mother.
In order to qualify for any of th<'::ie benrfitH a divorced woman is required
to show that: ( 1) slw was receiving at lea~t one-half of her support from
her former husband; (2) ~he was receiving substantial contributions from
her former husband pur~uant to a written agreement; or (3) there was a
court order in effect providing for sub~tantial contributions to her support
by her former husband .
"In some States the courts arc prohibited from providing for alimony,
and in these States a divorcrd woman is precluded from mreting the
third support rrquirement. Even in States which allow alimony, the
court may have decided at thr time of the divorce that the wife was
not in need of financial support. Moreover, a divorced woman's eligibility
for social security benefits may depend on the advice she received at the
time of her divorce. If a woman accepted a proprrty settlement in lieu
of alimony, she could, 111 effect, have d;squalifird herself for divorced wife's,
divorced widow's, or surviving divorced mother's benefits.

'

.
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have maintained uniform support requirements for divorced
wife's, divorced widow's, and surviving divorced mother's benefits. Obviously administration is thereby simplified. Undoubtedly some younger divorced wives with children of
deceased wage earners in their care who could not meet the
old support requirements incidentally benefit from Congress'
concern that many older women were being victimized once
by state divorce laws and again by the Social Security laws. 10
However, when Congress seeks to alleviate hardship and
inequity under the Social Security laws, it may quite rightly
conceive its task to be analogous to painting a fence, rather
than touching up an etching. We have repeatedly stated
that there is no constitutio11al requirement that "a statutory
provision filter[] out those, and only those, who are in the
factual position which generated the congressional concern
reflected in the statute." Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 777;
Matthews v. De Castro, supra, at 189. In sum, we conclude
"The intent of providing benefits to divorced women is to protect women
whose marriages are dissolved when they arc far along in years-particularly housewives who have not been able to work and earn social security
protection of their own. The committee believes that the support requirements of the law have operated to deprive some divorced women of the
protection they should have received and, thC'refore, recommends that these
requirements be eliminated. The requirement that the marriage of a
divorced wife or widow must have lasted for at least 20 years before the
divorce would not be changed."
S. Rep. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 142 (1972); see H. R. Rep. No. 231,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., 54-55 (1971). When the 1965 change· were made
there was only pa::;sing mrntion of younger women receiving mother's insurance benefits. S. Rep. No. 3Rl, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 108 (1965).
10 There are no precise figures a, to the extra cost to the insurance fund
posed by this expansion of mother's insurance benefits. It ran be inferred
from the attention this expan~ion received in the legislative- history that its
cost was a rclativrly small part of the $23 million annual increase in benefits estimated for eliminating support requirements across the board.
SeeS. Rep. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Ses::;., 142 (1972). HEW has estimated that compliance with the District Court's decision in this ca::;e will
eost $60 million annually.
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that the denial of mother's insurance benefits to women who
never married the wage earner bears a rational relation to the
government's desire to ease economic privation brought on by
the wage earner's death.
But the appellees argue that to characterize the problem in
this fashion is to miss the point because at root this case
involves discrimination against illegitimate children. Quite
naturally, those who seek benefits denied them by statute
will frame the constitutional issue in a manner most favorable
to their claim. The proper classification for purposes of equal
protection analysis is not an exact science, but scouting must
begin with the statutory classification itself. Only when it is
shown that the legislation has a substantial disparate impact
on classes defined in a different fashion may analysis continue
on the basis of the impact on those classes.
We conclude that the legislation in this case does not have
the impact on illegitimates necessary to warrant further
inquiry whether § 202 (g) is the product of discriminatory
purposes. See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, No. 78-233 (1979). "Mother's insurance benefits"
are distinct from "child's insurance benefits." The latter are
benefits paid to the minor children of the deceased wage
earner n and, as noted. Gonzales' son did receive child's insurance benefits. The benefit to a child as a result of the parent
or guardian's receipt of mother's insurance benefits is incidental: mother's insurance benefit payments do not vary with the
number of children within the recipient's care. they are not
available in the foster care context, and they are lost on
remarriage or if the surviving parent earns a substantial income-all despite the needs of the child. Thus the focus of
11 In Jimenez v. Weinbe1'gel', 417 U. S. 628 (1974), thio Court struck
down an absolute bar to child'~ insurance benefits for illegitimate children
whose patPrnity had never bern arknowPldgPd or affirmPd by rvidence of
domicile with or support by the wage earner before the onset of the
disability,

0

•
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these benefits is on the economic dilemma of the surviving
spouse or former spouse; the child's needs as such are addressed through the separate child's insurance benefits.' 2 Nor
is it invariably true that whatever derivative benefits are enjoyed by the child whose parent or guardian receives mother's
insurance benefits will not be enjoyed by Hlegitimate children.
If the illegitimate child is cared for by the decreased wage
earner's wife , she will receive mother's insurance benefits even
though she has no natural children of her own and never
adopted the child. tn And many legitimate children live in
households that are not headed by individuals eligible for
mother's benefits.
In order to make out a disparate impact warranting further
scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it is necessary to show that the class which is pur-·
portedly discriminated against consequently suffers significant deprivation of a benefit or imposition of a substantial
12

There iR obviously a signifirant difference brtwrPn this interpretation
of the statutory purpose and that subscribrd to by thr author of this
opinion in his He pa ratc concurrrner in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 , 655 ( 1975) . To the extmt tha t the8e intrrpretations conflict , the
author feels he can do no bettrr than quotr Mr. Justice Ja ckson, concurring
in McGrath v . Kri.stensen, 340 U. S. 162, 177-178 (1950):
"Precedent, however, is not laeking for ways by which a judge may recede
from a prior opinion that has proven unt enable and perhaps mislPd others.
See Chief Justice T aney , License Ca.ses, 5 How . 504, recanting views he
had prPSsed upon the Court as Attorney GPneml of Ma ryland in Brown
v. Maryland, 12 Whrat. 419 . Baron Bramwell Pxtricnted himself from a
somewhat similar Pmharassmrnt h~· sa~·ing, 'The matter dm•s not appear
to mr now as it appea rs to havr appearPd to me then.' Andrews v. Stymp,
26 L . T . R. (N. S.) 704, 706 . And Mr. Justice Star~·, accounting for his
contradietion of his own form r r opinion, quit<' proJWrl)· put thP matter:
'M y own error, howcve1·, can furnish no ground for its being adopted by
this Court ... .' Unit ed States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat.. 460, 478 . . . . If
there are other Wil)'S of gracefullr and good-natun•dly smrendering former
views to n better considered po~ition, I invokP them all."
l H Compa re 42 U. S. C. § 402 (g) (1) (E) (197(i) \\'ith id., § 402 (g) (1)
(F)(i).
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burden. If the class of beneficiaries were expanded in the
fashion pressed by appellees, the beneficiaries, in terms of
those who would exercise dominion over the benefits and
whose freedom of choice would be enhanced thereby, would
be unwed mothers, not illegitimate children. Certainly every
governmental benefit has a ripple effect through familial relationships and the economy generally, its propagation determined by the proximity and sensibility of others. Possibly
the largest class of incidental beneficiaries are those who are
gratified in a nonmaterial way to see a friend or relative receive benefits. Some limits must be imposed for purposes
of constitutional analysis, and we conclude that in this case
the incidental, and, to a large degree. speculative impact on
illegitimates as a class is not sufficient to treat the denial of
mother's insurance benefits to unwed mothers as discrimination against illegitimate children.
The Social Security Act and its amendments are the product
of hard choices and countervailing pressures. The desire to
alleviate hardship wherever it is found is tempered by the
concern that the social security system in this country remain
2. contributory insurance plan and not become a general
welfare program. General welfare objectives are addressed
through public assistance legislation. In light of the limited
resources of the insurance fund, any expansion of the class of
beneficiaries invariably poses the prospect of reduced benefits
to individual claimants. We need look no further than the
facts of this case for an illustration. The benefits available
to Norman W. Boles' beneficiaries under the Act are limited
by his earnings record. The effect of extending benefits to
Gonzales will be to reduce benefits to Nancy Boles and her
children by 20<fo. 14 Thus the end result of extending benefits
to Gonzales may be to deprive Nancy Boles of a meaningful
choice between full-time employment and staying home with
her children, thereby undermining the express legislative pur14

Brief for Appellant, at 29 n. 22.

78-808- 0PINION
CALIFANO v. BOLES

15

pose of mother's insurance benefits. We think Congress could
rationally choose to concentrate limited funds where the need
is likely to be greatest.
Because of our disposition of the Fifth Amendment issue,
we need not and do not reach the Government's other arguments: that the District Court improperly certified a nationwide class that included individuals who were not shown to
have met the jurisdictional requirements of § 205 (g) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g) , and that sovereign
immunity barred that court's award of retroactive monetary
relief.
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly,

Reversed.
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